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NOTES
VALIDITY OF CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS
IN KENTUCKY
Subscriptions to charitable institutions may be considerably
affected by the decision handed down by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in the case of Floyd v. Christian Church Widows amd
Orphans Home et al.1 In September, 1924, Henry A. Floyd and
Nannie H. Floyd, his wife, executed and delivered three writ-
ings in which they promised to pay a total of $10,000.00 to three
charitable and educational institutions. The following is a copy
of one of the instruments:
"For and in consideration of our interest in Christian benevo-
lence and in consideration of other gifts . . . and pledges being
made for the building and endowing of the Christian Church Widows
and Orphans Home . . . we hereby promise to pay to the said
Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home the sum of Twenty-
five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars. This amount is due and payable
sixty days after the death of the survivor of us. Bequests amounting
to $3,400.00 to our family as set out in the will of Henry A. Floyd
are to be preferred to this pledge ...
"Done at Oakland, Kentucky, this September 24, 1924.
HENRY A. FLOYD
NANNIE H. FLOYD." 2
The pledge payable to Transylvania University was solicited by
an agent. of the University and was written upon a prepared
form. However, the parts concerning the date and condition
of payment were added by the agent at the request of Floyd.
The other two pledges were substantially the same, except for
the sum to be paid and the fact that they were not solicited by
the institutions. It is to be noted that in none of the pledges
was there a statement of the purpose for which the money was
to be used. Mrs. Floyd died in Tay, 1937, and Mr. Floyd died a
few months later, leaving an estate of approximately $21,000.00
which, after the payment of debts, was more than sufficient to
pay the three pledges and the bequests to relatives which had
been given a priority in the pledges. However, a few days be-
fore his death, Mr. Floyd had executed a new will, revoking the
'Floyd v. Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home of Ken-
tucky, Same v. Transylvania University, Same v. Kentucky Female
Orphans School of Midway, 296 Ky. 196, 176 S. W. (2d) 125 (1943).
'Id. 296 Ky. 196 at 197, 176 S. W. (2d) 125 at 127 (1943).
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prior will, and after making a few minor bequests, had directed
that the residue of his estate be paid to his brothers and sisters.
The administrator refused to pay the pledges, claiming that the
promises were without consideration and that the gifts were
testamentary in character and void as not complying with the
Statute of Wills. Separate suits were filed and judgments in
favor of the institutions were appealed, the suits being consoli-
dated for this purpose. The Court of Appeals found the pledges
insufficient as testamentary gifts and invalid as contracts since
there was a lack of sufficient consideration. Judgements of the
lower court were accordingly reversed with instructions to dis-
miss the petitions.
Floyd's new will seemed to show an intent to nullify these"
pledges and this fact undoubtedly had some influence upon the
decision. The opinion is somewhat confused by the fact that
these particular )ledges were payable after death,3 although
the Court clearly and properly points out that the sole issue,
is the validity of the instruments as contracts.
The question cf the validity of both business and charitable
subscriptions has often been before the courts. It should be
noted, however, that there is a distinction which can be made
between charitable and business subscriptions. The business
subscription is made when the maker is in a contracting frame
of mind and expects a quid pro quo, while the charitable sub-
scription is made when the maker is in a giving frame of mind
and does not expect a return of a material nature. In the busi-
ness subscription the promisor frequently requests some positive
and definite act having a pecuniary benefit and it is not diffi-
cult, therefore, and is often legally sound, to interpret the doing
of the act as sufficient consideration for the promise. In the
charitable subscription, however, there is often no act requested
or any specification made as to the use of the money. For these
reasons the decisions in business subscription cases are not
authority for the determination of the validity of charitable
'mbscriptions, and the decision in the present case does not af-
fect business subscriptions.
In a few states charitable subscriptions are invalid unless a
The fact that a note or pledge is made payable at maker's death
does not neccessarily make it testamentary. See Miller et al. v.
Western College of Toledo, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432 (1898).
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sufficient consideration actually exists,4 but in most jurisdic-
tions a promise to make a gift to a charity is enforceable.5 The
courts, feeling that there is a strong public policy in favor of
the validity of such promises, have ignored the lack of consider-
ation or have found a sufficient consideration by the use of
fictions and implications.
Mlost writers favor the enforceability of these charitable
subscriptions, G and three main theories have been advanced by
the courts in holding them valid and enforceable, (1) as bilat-
eral contracts, (2) as unilateral contracts, and (3) by promis-
sory estoppel.
The application of the bilateral contract theory requires
the court to imply both a request by the subscriber for a prom-
ise from the institution that it will use his money in the way he
requests, and also that the institution gave the promise re-
quested. There is, in fact, seldom either a request by the sub-
scriber or an express promise by the institution, but many
courts have held charitable subscriptions valid on this theory,T
and there are many cases in Kentucky sustaining charitable
subscriptions in this way.8
4 Cottage Street M. E. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 23 Am.
Rep. 286 (1877); Albany Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y.
517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889); Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581
(1848); Dalhousie College at Halifax v. Estate of Arthur Boutilier,
95 A. L. R. 1298 (Canada, 1934).
1K. R. S. 381.260 provides: "... every grant, conveyance,
devise, gift, appointment and assignment made for any charitable
or humane purpose shall be valid if it points out with reasonable
certainty the purposes of the charity and the beneficiaries thereof."
See Harwood et al. v. Dick, 286 Ky. 423, 430, 150 S. W. (2d) 704, 708
(1941); Kentucky Christian Missionary Soc. v. Moren et al., 267 Ky.
358, 102 S. W. (2d) 335 (1937); see Gill's Ex'r. v. Woman's Club of
Louisville et al., 205 Ky. 731, 734, 266 S. W. (2d) 378, 380 (1924); see
Sprowl v. Blankenbaker et al., 127 S. W. 496, 497 (Ky., 1910); George
W. Given's Admr. v. John S. Shouse et al., 5 Ky. Law Rep. 419, 12
Ky. Opin. 372 (1883).
"1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) secs. 116, 117, 377; 1
PAGE, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1920) secs. 559, 560, 561, 562; Billig, The
Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12
CORN. L. Q. 467; Taylor, Charitable Subscription Contracts in Ken-
tucky (1940) 29 Ky. L. J. 23; see 95 A. L. R. 1305; 115 A. L. R.
589.TIn re Wheeler's Estate, 284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N. E. (2d) 425
(1936); Nebraska Wesleyan University v. Estate of Homer Griswold,
113 Neb. 256, 202 N. W. 609, 38 A. L. R. 858 (1925); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369,
159 N. E. 173 (1927).
8Hyden et al. v. Scott-Lees Collegiate Institution, 291 Ky. 139,
163 S. W. (2d) 295 (1942); Central University of Kentucky v.
Walter's Exrs., 122 Ky. 65, 90 S. W. 1066 (1906); Trustees Kentucky
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Also falling into this group are those subscriptions which
recite that they are made in consideration of the promises of
others. This clause has helped the courts to enforce subscrip-
tions upon the basis of a sufficient consideration when it has
been found that other promises were subsequently made in actual
reliance upon the subscription in question. It is often hard to
find that this is the fact, however, and in the present case there
was no evidence that others made subscriptions to the three in-
stitutions in reliance on those of the Floyds. Courts have held
many charitable subscriptions valid upon this theory.9 Although
it has not been applied to charitable subscriptions in Kentucky,
the Kentucky Courts have enforced many business subscriptions
oil this basis.10
The unilateral contract theory is easier to apply since it
requires the use of only one fiction, that is, an implied request
by the subscriber for an act. The performance of that act by
the institution is held to be the consideration requested. Courts
frequently interpret the statement of the purpose of the gift or
the designation of the use to which the money is to be applied
as the request of the promisor for an act. Thus it is easy for
the courts to hold that the establishment of an endowment fund,
the begimling or completion of work on a building, the raising of
a specified amount, or other similar acts are sufficient considera-
tion. Courts have had a tendency to hold that beginning an act
is sufficient to bind the promisor on his promise, although some
have required completion of the act." If completion of the act
Female Orphan School v. Fleming, Ex'r., 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 234
(1874); Collier v. Baptist Educational Society, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.)
68 (1847).
'Miller v. Oglethorpe University, 24 Ga. App. 388, 100 S. E. 784
(1919); United Masonic Temple Corporation v. Harris, 242 Ill. App.
296 (1927); Scott v. Triggs, 76 Ind. App. 69, 131 N. E. 415 (1921);
Rutherford College v. Payne, 209 N. C. 792, 184 S. E. 827 (1936); cf.
I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532
(1938); cf. Tioga County General Hospital v. Tidd, 298 N. Y. S. 460,
164 Misc. 273 (1937).
", Eagles, Treasurer, et al. v. Hafendorfer, 204 Ky. 696, 265 S. W.
35 (1924); Chicago Bldg. and Mfg. Co. v. Peterson, 133 Ky. 596, 118
S. W. 384 (1909); Curry v. Kentucky Western R. R. Co., 25 Ky. Law
Rep. 1372, 78 S. W. 435 (1904); Twin Creek and Colemansville Turn-
pike Road Co. v. Lancaster, Same v. Rennecker, 79 Ky. 552 (1881);
John G. Tully v. Cane Run and Kingsmill Turnpike Road Co., 5 Ky.
Opin. 330 (1871).
" Thomas A. Beach et al. v. The First Methodist Episcopal
Church, 96 Ill. 177 (1880); Jacob Ellinger's Adm'r. v. B. B. Brown
et al., 9 Ky. Opin. 514 (1877); Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60
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is necessary before the subscriber is legally bound then before
the money has actually been applied he may withdraw his
pledge, which would, in many cases, work a material hardship
upon the promisee. The bilateral theory, therefore, is more,
beneficial to the institution as it binds the promisor from the
time that the institution accepts the subscription.
Promissory estoppel is a newer theory, and one which has
the support of the Restatement of Contracts.r -' It is more
realistic than the other theories in that it does not require either
an implied request or an implied promise. In the first two
theories discussed a consideration sufficient to support the
promise has been read into the agreement, while in this theory
the courts admit frankly that no consideration exists. It holds
the promisor responsible for all promises which he makes, and
upon which the promisee has reasonably relied and substantially
acted, when it is clear that there will be a detriment done to the
promisee if the promise is not enforced. Several courts have
approved this theory either in decision or dictum, 13 while others
have refused to hold a promisor liable even though the promisee
has suffered a material detriment in relying on the promise. 14
The Kentucky Court has never used this theory, but implies in
N. E. 325 (1901); Barnes and others, trustees v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18
(1854).
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 90; 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 140; see 115 A. L. R. 152.
'Finley et al. v. Swinsky et al., 103 Conn. 624, -, 131 Atl.
420, 423 (1925) (holds that "every sufficient consideration, although
not technically an estoppel, contains the substantial elements of an
estoppel in pais, for, if a man by his promise induces another to
change his situation and is then permitted to deny the validity of the
promise, he is thus perpetrating a fraud, and injuring another by a
false promise."); Fluckey v. Anderson, 132 Neb. 664, 273 N. WV. 41
(1937); Andrew D. Ricketts, Ex., v. Katie Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77
N. W. 365 (1898); Gans v. Reimensnyder, Adm'r., etc., 110 Pa. 17, 2
Atl. 425 (1885); see Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60
F. (2d) 673, 675 (C. C. A. 2d 1932) (holds that "'Promissory estop-
pel' is now a recognized species of consideration . . . but . . .
(is) not intended to include all contracts supported by a considera-
tion."); see Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank
of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, - , 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927) (to the
effect that "There has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a
substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary require-
ments can be found in what is styled a promissory estoppel. ...
Certain, at least, it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our
law of charitable subscriptions."
"4James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A.
2d 1933); Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N- Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928);
Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848).
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the present case that the institutions could have recovered by
using this doctrine had there been evidence of substantial action
in reliance on the pledges.
The decision of the Kentucky Court invalidating these
promises upsets a century of precedent, but while the Court
closes one door by precluding the use of fictions, it opens another
by sanctioning the use of promissory estoppel in this type of
case. However, in order to benefit from this doctrine the insti-
tutions must do some positive act of a substantial nature, or
refrain from doing some act, which might reasonably have been
expected by the promisor as a natural result of his promise.
Although this decision is somewhat startling in view of the
favor which has been shown charitable subscriptions in previous
cases, it cannot be said that the decision is clearly wrong, since
the Court merely disregarded the implications generally applied
and required a strict conformity to the technical requirement
of consideration. Perhaps, however, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
has said, "decisions which have stood so long, and which are
supported by so many considerations of public policy and rea-
son, . . . (should) not be overruled to save the symmetry of a
concept which itself came into our law, . . .not so much from
any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical acci-
dents of practice and procedure.'"'1 It would seem, therefore,
that in this particular type of case, where institutions have
justifiably relied upon a well established rule of law, it may not
be best to change this rule in order to conform to a mere tech-
nical requirement and to preserve the symmetry of the law.
A\NE FLETCHER NoYES
" Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of
Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, - , 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927).
